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Article 8

Why the Rehnquist Court is Wrong About the
Establishment Clause
Erwin Chemerinsky*

I. INTRODUCTION

The wall that separates church and state is under assault. The initial
actions of the Bush Administration show its indifference, or more
accurately its hostility, to separation of church and state. At the
inauguration of President George W. Bush, on January 20, 2001, the
invocation and benediction were explicitly Christian prayers. In his first
few days as President, Bush created an office of faith-based programs to
channel federal funds to religious entities and proposed an education
plan that included vouchers that could be used for parochial schools.
Increasingly, enforcing a wall that separates church and state is
criticized as undue hostility to religion, rather than recognition of a
constitutional mandate for a secular government. For example, in
Mitchell v. Helms, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for a plurality of four
justices-he was joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy-and contended that a
denial of aid to parochial schools was undue hostility to religion.' He
wrote:
[T]he inquiry into the recipient's religious views required by a focus
on whether a school is pervasively sectarian is not only unnecessary
but also offensive. It is well established, in numerous other contexts,
that courts should refrain from trolling through a person's or
institution's religious beliefs .... [H]ostility to aid to pervasively
sectarian 2 schools has a shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to
disavow.
Similarly, in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, in response
to the majority's declaring unconstitutional student-delivered prayers at

*

Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science,

University of Southern California.
1. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion).
2. Id. at 828 (plurality opinion).
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high school football games, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
3
dissent, saw the majority's opinion as unjustified "hostility" to religion.
Most significantly, the Supreme Court seems much less committed to
enforcing a wall that separates church and state. For the last thirty
years, the Court has followed a test in Establishment Clause cases that
was announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 4 In Lemon, the Court declared:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion." 5 A law is unconstitutional if it
fails any prong of the Lemon test. Now, though, four justices have
indicated that they want to overrule the Lemon test-Rehnquist, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas. 6 These four justices have expressed a desire for
a new test that allows much more government aid to religion and much
more of a religious presence in government. They call for an
"accommodationist" approach where the government would be deemed
to violate the Establishment Clause only if it literally creates a church,
or if it favors one religion over others, or if it coerces religious
participation. Very little would violate the Establishment Clause under
this approach that would emphasize judicial deference to the
government in its choices concerning religion.
In this paper, I want to criticize this trend and defend a wall
separating church and state. Part II explains the desirability of having a
secular government with religion protected in the private realm. Part III
applies this to two recent issues, aid to parochial schools and charitable
choice. Ultimately, my central point is that the Rehnquist Court is
wrong about the Establishment Clause.
I write this with recognition that President George W. Bush's
nominations to the Supreme Court are likely to change dramatically the
law of the Establishment Clause. Conservatives on the Supreme Court,
such as Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, have repeatedly
urged the overruling of precedents limiting aid to parochial schools and
prohibiting school prayer.7 Currently, as evidenced by the Court's

3. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
4. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5. Id. at 612-13.
6. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 660-74
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
7. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 508 U. S. at 398-99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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decision in Mitchell in June 2000,8 there are four justices-Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-desiring a
radical change in the law of the Establishment Clause. Thus, even one
appointment to the Court, for example replacing Justice John Paul
Stevens or Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, could bring about this shift.
There is every reason to believe that a Bush nominee to the high
Court would be the needed fifth vote for a dramatic change in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. While a candidate for President,
Bush explicitly said that he wanted to appoint justices like Scalia and
Thomas. Even more importantly, as evidenced by his support for
charitable choice and aid to faith-based programs, Bush obviously cares
deeply about allowing more government aid to religion. Through his
appointments to the Supreme Court, Bush can greatly increase the
likelihood that his proposals will be approved.
My goal in this paper is to try to explain why the conservatives'
approach to the Establishment Clause is misguided and why a
separation of church and state is necessary and desirable.
II.

WHY SEPARATE CHURCH AND STATE?

A. The Futility of a HistoricalInquiry
As with all constitutional provisions, some look to history as a guide
to the meaning of the religion clauses. This is particularly difficult for
these provisions because there is no apparent agreement among the
framers as to what they meant. Justice Brennan expressed this well
when he stated:
A too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon the
issues of these cases seems to me futile and misdirected for several
reasons ....[T]he historical record is at best ambiguous, and
statements 9can readily be found to support either side of the
proposition.
Yet, justices on all sides of the issue continue to invoke history and
the framers' intent to support their position. Chief Justice Rehnquist
has remarked that "[t]he true meaning of the Establishment Clause can
only be seen in its history."' 10 In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the University of Virginia, which concerned whether a public university
could deny student activity funds to a religious group, both Justice

8. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion).
9. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
10. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Thomas in a concurring opinion and Justice Souter dissenting focused at
length on James Madison's views of religious freedom. II
As Professor Laurence Tribe has cogently summarized, there were at
least three main views of religion among key framers. 12
[A]t least three distinct schools of thought ... influenced the drafters
of the Bill of Rights: first, the evangelical view (associated primarily
with Roger Williams) that "worldly corruptions ...

might consume

the churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness were not
maintained"; second, the Jeffersonian view that the church should be
walled off from the state in order to safeguard secular interests (public
and private) "against ecclesiastical depredations and incursions"; and,
third, the Madisonian view that religious and secular interests alike
would be advanced best by diffusing and decentralizing power so as to
assure competition among sects rather than dominance by any one. 13
These are quite distinct views of the proper relationship between
religion and the government. Roger Williams was primarily concerned
that government involvement with religion would corrupt and
undermine religion, whereas Thomas Jefferson had the opposite fear
that religion would corrupt and undermine the government. James
Madison saw religion as one among many types of factions that existed
and that needed to be preserved. He wrote that
[i]n a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as
that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity
of interests, and the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of
security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and
sects. 14
The problem of using history in interpreting the religion clauses is
compounded by the enormous changes in the country since the First
Amendment was adopted. The country is much more religiously
diverse in the 1990s than it was in 1791. Justice Brennan observed that
our religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than
were our forefathers. They knew differences chiefly among Protestant
sects. Today the Nation is far more heterogeneous religiously,
including as it does substantial minorities not only of Catholics and

11. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). James
Madison issued his famous Remonstrance in arguing against a Virginia decision renewing a tax to
support the church. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947) (reviewing Madison's
argument); id. at 31-34 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
12. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158-60 (2d ed. 1988).
13. Id. at 1158-59 (citations omitted).
14. THE FEDERALISTNO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Jews but as well of those who worship according
to no version of the
15
Bible and those who worship no God at all.
Also, as discussed below, a significant number of cases involving the
Establishment Clause have arisen in the context of religious activities in
connection with schools. But public education, as it exists now, did not
exist when the Bill of Rights was ratified and it is inherently difficult to
apply the framers' views to situations that they could not have
imagined. Justice Brennan also remarked that "the structure of
American education has greatly changed since the First Amendment
was adopted. In the context of our modern emphasis upon public
education available to all citizens, any views of the eighteenth century
as to whether the exercises at bar are an 'establishment' offer little aid
to decision." 16
The reality is that the divergence of views among the framers, and the
abstractness with which they were stated, makes it possible for those on
all sides of the debate to invoke history in support of their positions. 17 I
do not believe that the framers' intent should be controlling in
constitutional interpretation, even if it could be known, 18 and in the area
of religion I do not think there ever will be more than each side finding
apt quotations to support its position.
B. Religion is Different
Those who oppose a separation of church and state emphasize that
religion should not be treated any differently from other beliefs. For
example, Justice Thomas in his plurality opinion in Mitchell stressed
that religious schools should not be treated any differently from other
schools. 19 In many cases, the Court has said that a school should not
20
treat religious groups any differently from non-religious ones.
But this ignores that under the Constitution religion is different from
other beliefs. Unlike all other views, the Constitution uniquely forbids
15. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 238 (Brennan, J., concurring).
17. Compare Phillip Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An
Historical Perspective, 60 GE O. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992), with Michael McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. I (both considering the historical intent behind
the Establishment Clause).
18.

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1987).

19. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion).
20. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Sch. Dist., 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001) (excluding a
religious group from using school facilities was found to be an infringement of freedom of speech
when secular groups had use of the facilities); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)
(declaring unconstitutional a state university's policy of preventing student groups from using
school facilities for religious worship or religious discussion).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

the government from establishing religion. Indeed, the Court often has
treated religion differently from other beliefs. For example, in Sherbert
v. Verner, the Court held that the government cannot deny benefits to
those who quit their jobs for religious reasons. 21 The Court followed
this principle in many other cases. 2 2 But there never has been a case
holding that a person must be given benefits if he or she quits a job
because of secular beliefs.
There are many good reasons for treating religion differently from
other beliefs. History shows the tremendous risk of intolerance,
persecution, and divisiveness based on religion. There is thus a need to
protect the ability of people to engage in the religion of their choice, but
also a need to ensure that the government remains strictly secular.
Religion is special because of the role it occupies in people's lives and it
is because of this that religion is appropriately treated differently under
the Constitution.
C. The Benefits of a Secular Government
There are many important values served by protecting a wall
separating church and state. First, the Establishment Clause protects
freedom of conscience. I believe that freedom of conscience is the
central and uniting goal of the various parts of the First Amendment.
One way in which the separation of church and state protects freedom
of conscience is by ensuring that people are not taxed to support
religions other than their own. The famous statement of Thomas
Jefferson concerning the need for a wall separating church and state and
James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments were made in the context of opposing a state tax to aid the
church.23
Jefferson spoke of the unconscionability of taxing people to support
religions that they do not believe in. The Supreme Court has described
Jefferson's belief that
21. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
22. See, e.g., Frazee v. I11.Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding that a
state law that required unemployed individuals to be available for work seven days a week
infringed free exercise when it was applied to deny benefits to an individual who refused to work
on his Sunday Sabbath); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136
(1987) (applying Sherbert and Thomas the Court held that the state was required to provide
unemployment benefits to a woman who was fired when she refused to work on her Saturday
Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Rd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that the government could not
deny unemployment benefits to an individual who quit his job rather than accept a transfer to
work in an armaments section of the factory).
23. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785),
reprintedin Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947).

2001]

Why the Rehnquist Court is Wrong

'to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and
tyrannical; ... even the forcing him to support this or that teacher of

his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable
liberty of giving his contributions
to the particular pastor, whose
' 24
morals he would make his pattern.
Madison said: "[T]he same authority which can force a citizen to
contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any' 25
one
establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment."
It is wrong to make me support a church that teaches that my religion
or my beliefs are evil. It violates my freedom of conscience to force me
to support religions that I do not accept. Justice Souter explained that
"compelling an individual to support religion violates the fundamental
principle of freedom of conscience. Madison's and Jefferson's now
familiar words establish clearly that liberty of personal conviction
requires freedom from coercion to support religion, and this means that
26
the government can compel no aid to fund it."
Second, the Establishment Clause serves a fundamental purpose of
inclusion in that it allows all in society, of every religion and of no
religion, to feel that the government is theirs. When the government
supports religion, inescapably those of different religions feel excluded.
Equality does not solve this. In a society that is overwhelmingly
Christian, those of minority faiths are meant to feel marginalized and
unwelcome. If equality were the only constraint imposed by the
Establishment Clause, a school could begin each day with a prayer so
long as every religion got its due. Assuming a school reflecting
America's religious diversity, the vast majority of days would begin
with Christian prayers. Those with no religion would be made to feel
that it was not their school, as would those of minority religions who
routinely would be subjected to prayers of Christian religions.
This goal of inclusion is central, not incidental, to the Establishment
Clause. Justice O'Connor has explained: Direct government action
endorsing religion or a particular religion is invalid because it "'sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the

24. Everson, 330 U.S. at 13 (quoting the preamble to the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty
written by Thomas Jefferson).
25. Id. at 64-65 (quoting Madison's Remonstrance).
26. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 870 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that
27
they are insiders, favored members of the political community.'
Consider the most blatant violation of the Establishment Clause: a
city or state declares a particular religion, say Catholicism, to be the
official religion. Assuming that the government took no actions to limit
free exercise by those of other faiths, why is such a declaration
unacceptable? The pronouncement that Catholicism is the official
religion makes all of a different faith feel unwelcome. They are made to
feel that they are tolerated guests, not equal members of the community.
In Justice O'Connor's words, nonadherents unquestionably are made to
feel outsiders and adherents are made to feel insiders.
In other words, the very core of the Establishment Clause prevents
the government from taking actions that divide people in this way. The
focus of the Establishment Clause is thus very much on the effect of the
message on the audience. This helps to explain why Justice Scalia is
simply wrong in his dissent in Lee v. Weisman where he expresses the
28
need to protect the majority in the audience who want to hear a prayer.
The Establishment Clause is about preventing the majority, through
government power, from making those of other religions feel
unwelcome. If the majority of the audience wants to hear prayers, of
course it may do so; but not at an official government function,
especially one where the audience is compelled to be present. The
problem is much greater than it was when the First Amendment was
adopted. The country is much more religiously diverse in the 1990s
than it was in 1791.
Third, separating church and state protects religion from the
government. If the government provides assistance, inescapably there
are and should be conditions attached. For example, when the
government gives money, it must make sure that the funds are used for
their intended purpose. This necessarily involves the government
placing conditions on the funds and monitoring how it is spent. Such
government entanglement is a threat to religion. This concern is not
new. Roger Williams, for example, expressed great concerns that
"worldly corruptions ...might consume the churches if sturdy fences
against the wilderness were not maintained.- 29 Justice Souter also
expressed this as a fundamental basis for the Establishment Clause:

27. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment)).
28. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1158-60.
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Madison argued that
[G]overnment aid corrupts religion.
establishment of religion weakened the beliefs of adherents so
favored, strengthened their opponents, and generated "pride and
indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; [and] in
both, superstition, bigotry and persecution."... In a variant of
Madison's concern, we have repeatedly noted that a government's
favor to a particular
religion or sect threatens to taint it with "corrosive
30
secularism."
III. APPLYING STRICT SEPARATION ANALYSIS
A. Aid to ParochialSchools
In Mitchell, Justice Thomas, writing for the plurality of four, urged a
major change in the law concerning the Establishment Clause and aid to
parochial schools. Justice Thomas argued that aid to parochial schools
should be allowed, even if it is used for religious education, so long as
the government is even-handed among religions. Justice Thomas wrote:
"In short, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion of
pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs,
and other doctrines of this Court bar it. This doctrine, born of bigotry,
should be buried now." 3 1 Those who attack the wall separating church
and state often do so, as Justice Thomas did in Mitchell, by invoking the
rhetoric of equality; they argue that the central requirement of the
Establishment Clause is that the government should treat all religions
equally.
The majority of the justices in Mitchell rejected this approach and
explicitly recognized that it would be a radical and unprecedented shift
in the law of the Establishment Clause. Justice O'Connor, in an opinion
concurring in the judgment, observed: "[W]e have never held that a
government-aid program passes constitutional muster solely because of
32
the neutral criteria it employs as a basis for distributing aid."
Similarly, Justice Souter in dissent wrote: "The insufficiency of
evenhandedness neutrality as a stand-alone criterion of constitutional
intent or effect has been clear from the beginning of our interpretative
33
efforts."
Never has a majority of the Supreme Court held, as Justice Thomas
argued for in Mitchell, that neutrality is the sole test for government aid

30.
31.
32.
33.

Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 871 (Souter, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 829 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 839 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 884 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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to religions. The fundamental change in the law proposed by Justice
Thomas can be seen in many ways. First, the test which the Supreme
Court has followed for the last thirty years limits the government's
ability to aid or foster religion, even if it is being neutral among
religions. 34 The Lemon test, by its very terms, does not emphasize
equality among religions, but rather prohibits government aid to
religion, even if it is equal, if it is with the purpose or effect of
advancing religion or would entail excessive government entanglement
with religion. Justice Thomas' approach in Mitchell obviously would
mean overruling the Lemon test that has been controlling for the past
three decades.
Second, Justice Thomas' approach would profoundly change the law
because no longer would the Establishment Clause be a barrier to
government aid to religion or religious presence in government. For at
least a half century, the Court always has regarded the Establishment
Clause as an affirmative limit on what the government may do, even if
it is acting neutrally among religions. Justice Thomas would reject that
entirely.
For example, the Court has said that prayer, even voluntary prayer in
public schools, is unconstitutional.3 5 Justice Thomas' approach would
make prayer permissible so long as all religions had an equal chance to
present their prayers. Likewise, when the Court has approved
government aid programs outside the area of parochial schools, it has
stressed that pervasively sectarian organizations must be excluded. In
Bowen v. Kendrick, the Court deemed constitutional the Adolescent
Family Life Act which provided for grants to organizations to provide
counseling and care to pregnant adolescents and their parents, and also
to provide counseling to prevent adolescent sexual activity. 36 The law
specifically authorized receipt of grants by religious, as well as nonreligious, organizations. The law prohibited the use of any federal
funds for family planning services, for abortion counseling, or for
abortions.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority in the 5-4 decision and
applied the Lemon test to uphold the law. Rehnquist said that the law
"was motivated primarily, if not entirely, by a legitimate secular
purpose-the elimination or reduction of social and economic problems

34. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
35. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
36. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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caused by teenage sexuality, pregnancy, and parenthood. 3 7 The Court
stressed that the law was constitutional because it excluded pervasively
sectarian institutions and organizations from receiving money. The
Court explained that cases holding aid unconstitutional had been where
the assistance was to institutions that "were pervasively sectarian and
had as a substantial purpose the inculcation of religious values." 38 The
Court said that "[h]ere, by contrast, there is no reason to assume that the
religious organizations which may receive grants are 'pervasively
sectarian' in the same sense as the Court has held parochial schools to
39
be."
Justice Thomas expressly declared that he wants the Court to disavow
any limits on aid to pervasively sectarian institutions. Indeed, Justice
Thomas' approach would allow massive aid to parochial schools, so
long as all religions are treated equally. Justice Souter powerfully made
this point:
Hence, if we looked no further than evenhandedness, and failed to ask
what activities the aid might support, or in fact did support, religious
schools could be blessed with government funding as massive as
expenditures made for the benefit of their public school counterparts,
and religious missions would thrive on public money. This is why the
consideration of less than universal neutrality has never been
recognized as dispositive and has always been teamed with attention
to other facts bearing on the
substantive prohibition of support for a
4
school's religious objective. 0
In other words, the Court always has seen the Establishment Clause
as a barrier of government aid directly to religion, even when the
government is being even-handed. Justice Thomas would completely
eliminate that constraint. As Justice Souter explained: "[O]ne point [is]
clear beyond peradventure: together with James Madison we have
consistently understood the Establishment Clause to impose a
substantive prohibition against public 4aid
to religion and, hence, to the
1
religious mission of sectarian schools."
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the implications of Justice
Thomas' approach is that the government must fund parochial school
education, at least to the extent that it provides any aid to private secular
schools. Justice Thomas' approach clearly implies that excluding

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 602.
Id. at 616 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 885 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 899 (Souter, J., dissenting).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

religion is not neutral and constitutes impermissible discrimination
under the Establishment Clause.
Justice Thomas argued that it is offensive for the government to even
look to whether an organization is religious in character. He declares:
"[T]he inquiry into the recipient's religious views required by a focus
on whether a school is pervasively sectarian is not only unnecessary but
also offensive. It is well established, in numerous other contexts, that
courts should refrain from trolling through a person's or institution's
religious beliefs. 4 2 But if the government cannot consider religion in
distributing money, it will be required to subsidize religious schools on
the same terms that it funds non-religious ones. Justice Thomas
acknowledges and endorses this: "[T]he religious nature of a recipient
should not matter to the constitutional analysis, so long as the recipient
43
adequately furthers the government's secular purpose."
Thus, Justice Thomas' equality approach would not simply allow
massive government aid to religious institutions, it would mandate it.
Never before has a justice suggested, let alone a plurality endorsed, such
a radical change in the law of the Establishment Clause.
The shift to equality would be inconsistent with the values of the
Establishment Clause discussed above. First, freedom of conscience
would be offended because people would be forced to support and
subsidize religions that they do not believe in, even if all religions are
treated equally. Second, treating all religions equally does not address
the need to make all feel comfortable with their government. Those
who disavow any religious belief would be forced to support all
religions; indeed, they would be surrounded with parochial schools
supported by their tax dollars. Forcing them to hear prayers of every
religion inevitably would make them feel unwelcome in their own
schools and their own country. The Establishment Clause should be
interpreted to forbid this. Third, nor does equality protect religions
from the intrusion of government involvement. Justice Thomas'
equality theory would mean that the government would be enmeshed in
almost every aspect of religious schools and religious institutions. The
government, as a condition for funding, could-and should-set
curricula and educational requirements. The government would need to
monitor to see if these mandates were met. This is a threat to religion
and it is no less so because all religions are threatened equally.

42. Id. at 828 (plurality opinion).
43. Id. at 827 (plurality opinion).
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For all of these reasons, Justice Thomas' equality theory is
undesirable as a way of interpreting the First Amendment. The
Establishment Clause should be seen as a limit on government
involvement with religion and religious involvement with government,
not simply a requirement for even-handedness.
What, then, is the rationale for a theory that never has been accepted
in 210 years of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and that seems so at
odds with what the provision is about? Two justifications seem
strongest. First is the desirability of equality and the undesirability of
discrimination. The rhetorical appeal of Justice Thomas' theory is that
it calls for even-handedness and non-discrimination. His approach says
that religion should be treated the same as secularism, no better and no
worse.
But this rests on a basic misdefinition of equality. As Aristotle
explained, equality is about treating likes alike and unalikes differently.
Justice Thomas is assuming that religious and secular schools are alike
in their relationship to the government. However, for all of the reasons
explained above, they are not alike and the Constitution should be
understood as commanding that religion be treated differently.
If Justice Thomas' theory were adopted by the Court's majority, a
religious school could sue the government for funds claiming that the
denial of money was impermissible discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. But the government should prevail by
explaining the compelling interest it has in treating religion differently
for the reasons explained above. Equality only is a benefit if it is
44
desirable to treat the recipients equally.
Second, the equality theory has the virtue of simplicity. No longer
will lines need to be drawn between types of permissible and
impermissible assistance. The only requirement would be ensuring no
discrimination among religions. This would eliminate the need for line
drawing of the sort that has occurred for decades concerning what the
government may give to parochial schools. For example, the Court has
upheld the government providing buses to take children to and from
parochial schools, 45 but not buses to take parochial school students on
44. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537, 542 (1982).
Professor Westen argues that equality is unnecessary as a concept because it always is necessary
to develop standards to decide which inequalities are acceptable and which intolerable. Id. at
537. Westen says that once these standards exist they can be the basis for decisions, making the
concept of equality superfluous. Id. In other words, in the context of the Establishment Clause,
the issue is what aid should the government be providing to parochial schools. Once this is
answered, then equality is not at issue.
45. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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field trips. 46 The Court has allowed the government to provide
parochial schools textbooks for secular subjects,47 but not audiovisual
equipment.4 8 The Court has forbidden the government from paying
teacher salaries in parochial schools, even for teachers of secular
subjects; 49 but the Court allowed the government to provide a signinterpreter for hearing-impaired students in parochial schools.5 ° The
Court has permitted the government to pay for administering
standardized tests in parochial schools, 5 1 but not for essay exams
assessing writing achievement.5 2
There are two major problems with this argument: it overstates the
difficulties in line drawing, and it overstates the benefits of clarity in
this regard. As to the former, the reality is that over a half century the
Court had developed a workable set of standards concerning permissible
government aid to religion. Although the distinctions described above
often seem arbitrary, it is possible to identify several criteria that
explain them. While not every case fits the pattern, in general, the
Court is likely to uphold aid if three criteria are met. First, the aid must
be available to all students enrolled in public and parochial schools; aid
that is available only to parochial school students is sure to be
invalidated. Second, the aid is more likely to be allowed if it is
provided directly to the students than if it is provided to the schools.
Third, the aid will be permitted if it is a type that likely cannot be used
for religious instruction, but it will be invalidated if it can be easily used
for religious education.
These criteria help explain the seemingly arbitrary distinctions
described above. For example, buses to take children to and from
school are provided to students at all schools and are not involved in
education itself, but buses for field trips might be to see cathedrals or
religious icons. The content of state prescribed standardized tests is
secular, but teacher-written essay exams might be on religious subjects.
Each of the three criteria is examined in turn.

46. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793

(2000).
47. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
48. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000).
49. Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
50. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
51. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
52. Levitt v. Cmty. for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
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Second, the value of simplicity is overstated by those who support the
equality theory. Line drawing is inherent to constitutional law. For the
reasons described above, the equality theory is so at odds with what the
Establishment Clause should be seen as being about that it should not be
deemed acceptable just because it is simpler.
B. CharitableChoice
One of President Bush's first acts as President was to create an Office
of Faith Based Programs in the White House. The goal is to allow
religious entities to receive federal funds for providing social services.
This often is called "charitable choice."
In understanding this proposal, it is important to recognize that faithbased programs already can receive government money and participate
in social service programs. However, currently, they must create
separate secular arms to do so. Organizations like Catholic Charities
and Jewish Family and Social Services long have received government
money and provided important services. Bush's proposal would change
this by allowing the financial aid to go directly to the religious entity. It
would be a major transfer of funds right from the federal treasury to
religions.
This violates all of the principles underlying the Establishment
Clause described above. First, it would require people to financially
support religions. The effect of charitable choice is forcing a Jewish
person to subsidize a religion that teaches that belief in Christ is the way
to stay off drugs; it is forcing an atheist to subsidize a soup kitchen that
engages in group prayers.
Second, charitable choice programs inherently are likely to be
coercive. Imagine a person convicted of a drug crime and told that the
choice is prison or drug diversion, but the only drug diversion program
is a religious one. This is easy to imagine in small towns, but also in
big cities where there often are not nearly enough slots to meet the
demand. Charitable choice proposals say that there must be a secular
alternative, but it never has been clear as to how this is possible. The
result inevitably seems to be forced participation in religions.
Third, government money understandably comes with conditions of
how it can be used and monitoring. This would enmesh the federal
government in religious programs to an unprecedented extent. The
federal government must regulate how its money is used and make sure
that the conditions are being met. It is exactly for this reason that some
religious leaders have opposed charitable choice.
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IV. CONCLUSION

For decades, the Supreme Court followed a strict separationist
philosophy. In recent years, there has been a major shift away from this
approach and there is the prospect of an even greater change in the years
to come as President Bush has the opportunity to make appointments to
the Supreme Court. Thomas Jefferson was right over two hundred
years ago when he said that there should be a wall separating church
and state. The wall is under assault and there is the chance that soon
nothing will be left of it but rubble.
Therefore, it is important to realize again the values served by having
a wall separating church and state, of keeping government secular and
protecting religion in the private realm. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court increasingly seems insensitive to these values and the need for
judicial protection of them. The Rehnquist Court is just wrong when it
comes to the Establishment Clause.

